Nurse Entrance Test v1.0

Those examples of poetic justice that occur in medieval and Elizabethan literature, and that seem so satisfying, have encouraged a whole school of twentieth- century scholars to "find" further examples. In fact, these scholars have merely forced victimized character into a moral framework by which the injustices inflicted on them are, somehow or other, justified. Such scholars deny that the sufferers in a tragedy are innocent; they blame the victims themselves for their tragic fates.
Any misdoing is enough to subject a character to critical whips. Thus, there are long essays about the misdemeanors of Webster"™s Duchess of Malfi, who defined her brothers, and he behavior of Shakespeare"™s Desdemona, who disobeyed her father.
Yet it should be remembered that the Renaissance writer Matteo Bandello strongly protests the injustice of the severe penalties issued to women for acts of disobedience that men could, and did, commit with virtual impunity. And Shakespeare, Chaucer, and Webster often enlist their readers on the side of their tragic heroines by describing injustices so cruel that readers cannot but join in protest. By portraying Griselda, in the Clerk"™s Tale, as a meek, gentle victim who does not criticize, much less rebel against the prosecutor, her husband Waltter, Chaucer incites readers to espouse Griselda"™s cause against Walter"™s oppression. Thus, efforts to supply historical and theological rationalization for Walter"™s persecutions tend to turn Chaucer"™s fable upside down, to deny its most obvious effect on reader"™s sympathies. Similarly, to assert that Webster"™s Duchess deserved torture and death because she chose to marry the man she loved and to bear their children is, in effect to join forces with her tyrannical brothers, and so to confound the operation of poetic justice, of which readers should approve, with precisely those examples of social injustice that Webster does everything in his power to make readers condemn. Indeed. Webster has his heroin so heroically lead the resistance to tyranny that she may well in spire members of the audience to imaginatively join forces with her against the cruelty and hypocritical morality of her brothers.
Thus Chaucer and Webster, in their different ways, attack injustice, argue on behalf of the victims, and prosecute the persecutors. Their readers serve them as a court of appeal that remains free to rule, as the evidence requires, and as common humanity requires, in favour of the innocent and injured parties. For, to paraphrase the noted eighteenth-century scholar, Samuel Johnson, despite all the refinements of subtlety and the dogmatism of learning, it is by the common sense and compassion of readers who are uncorrupted by the characters and situations in mereval and Elizabetahn literature, as in any other literature, can best be judged.
The primary purpose of the passage is to

Those examples of poetic justice that occur in medieval and Elizabethan literature, and that seem so satisfying, have encouraged a whole school of twentieth- century scholars to "find" further examples. In fact, these scholars have merely forced victimized character into a moral framework by which the injustices inflicted on them are, somehow or other, justified. Such scholars deny that the sufferers in a tragedy are innocent; they blame the victims themselves for their tragic fates.
Any misdoing is enough to subject a character to critical whips. Thus, there are long essays about the misdemeanors of Webster"™s Duchess of Malfi, who defined her brothers, and he behavior of Shakespeare"™s Desdemona, who disobeyed her father.
Yet it should be remembered that the Renaissance writer Matteo Bandello strongly protests the injustice of the severe penalties issued to women for acts of disobedience that men could, and did, commit with virtual impunity. And Shakespeare, Chaucer, and Webster often enlist their readers on the side of their tragic heroines by describing injustices so cruel that readers cannot but join in protest. By portraying Griselda, in the Clerk"™s Tale, as a meek, gentle victim who does not criticize, much less rebel against the prosecutor, her husband Waltter, Chaucer incites readers to espouse Griselda"™s cause against Walter"™s oppression. Thus, efforts to supply historical and theological rationalization for Walter"™s persecutions tend to turn Chaucer"™s fable upside down, to deny its most obvious effect on reader"™s sympathies. Similarly, to assert that Webster"™s Duchess deserved torture and death because she chose to marry the man she loved and to bear their children is, in effect to join forces with her tyrannical brothers, and so to confound the operation of poetic justice, of which readers should approve, with precisely those examples of social injustice that Webster does everything in his power to make readers condemn. Indeed. Webster has his heroin so heroically lead the resistance to tyranny that she may well in spire members of the audience to imaginatively join forces with her against the cruelty and hypocritical morality of her brothers.
Thus Chaucer and Webster, in their different ways, attack injustice, argue on behalf of the victims, and prosecute the persecutors. Their readers serve them as a court of appeal that remains free to rule, as the evidence requires, and as common humanity requires, in favour of the innocent and injured parties. For, to paraphrase the noted eighteenth-century scholar, Samuel Johnson, despite all the refinements of subtlety and the dogmatism of learning, it is by the common sense and compassion of readers who are uncorrupted by the characters and situations in mereval and Elizabetahn literature, as in any other literature, can best be judged.
It can be inferred from the passage that the author consider Chaucer's Grisselda to be

Those examples of poetic justice that occur in medieval and Elizabethan literature, and that seem so satisfying, have encouraged a whole school of twentieth- century scholars to "find" further examples. In fact, these scholars have merely forced victimized character into a moral framework by which the injustices inflicted on them are, somehow or other, justified. Such scholars deny that the sufferers in a tragedy are innocent; they blame the victims themselves for their tragic fates.
Any misdoing is enough to subject a character to critical whips. Thus, there are long essays about the misdemeanors of Webster"™s Duchess of Malfi, who defined her brothers, and he behavior of Shakespeare"™s Desdemona, who disobeyed her father.
Yet it should be remembered that the Renaissance writer Matteo Bandello strongly protests the injustice of the severe penalties issued to women for acts of disobedience that men could, and did, commit with virtual impunity. And Shakespeare, Chaucer, and Webster often enlist their readers on the side of their tragic heroines by describing injustices so cruel that readers cannot but join in protest. By portraying Griselda, in the Clerk"™s Tale, as a meek, gentle victim who does not criticize, much less rebel against the prosecutor, her husband Waltter, Chaucer incites readers to espouse Griselda"™s cause against Walter"™s oppression. Thus, efforts to supply historical and theological rationalization for Walter"™s persecutions tend to turn Chaucer"™s fable upside down, to deny its most obvious effect on reader"™s sympathies. Similarly, to assert that Webster"™s Duchess deserved torture and death because she chose to marry the man she loved and to bear their children is, in effect to join forces with her tyrannical brothers, and so to confound the operation of poetic justice, of which readers should approve, with precisely those examples of social injustice that Webster does everything in his power to make readers condemn. Indeed. Webster has his heroin so heroically lead the resistance to tyranny that she may well in spire members of the audience to imaginatively join forces with her against the cruelty and hypocritical morality of her brothers.
Thus Chaucer and Webster, in their different ways, attack injustice, argue on behalf of the victims, and prosecute the persecutors. Their readers serve them as a court of appeal that remains free to rule, as the evidence requires, and as common humanity requires, in favour of the innocent and injured parties. For, to paraphrase the noted eighteenth-century scholar, Samuel Johnson, despite all the refinements of subtlety and the dogmatism of learning, it is by the common sense and compassion of readers who are uncorrupted by the characters and situations in mereval and Dlizabetahn literature, as in any other literature, can best be judged.
The author's tone in her discussion of the conclusion's reached by the "school of twentieth-century scholars" (line 4) is best described as

Those examples of poetic justice that occur in medieval and Elizabethan literature, and that seem so satisfying, have encouraged a whole school of twentieth- century scholars to "find" further examples. In fact, these scholars have merely forced victimized character into a moral framework by which the injustices inflicted on them are, somehow or other, justified. Such scholars deny that the sufferers in a tragedy are innocent; they blame the victims themselves for their tragic fates.
Any misdoing is enough to subject a character to critical whips. Thus, there are long essays about the misdemeanors of Webster"™s Duchess of Malfi, who defined her brothers, and he behavior of Shakespeare"™s Desdemona, who disobeyed her father.
Yet it should be remembered that the Renaissance writer Matteo Bandello strongly protests the injustice of the severe penalties issued to women for acts of disobedience that men could, and did, commit with virtual impunity. And Shakespeare, Chaucer, and Webster often enlist their readers on the side of their tragic heroines by describing injustices so cruel that readers cannot but join in protest. By portraying Griselda, in the Clerk"™s Tale, as a meek, gentle victim who does not criticize, much less rebel against the prosecutor, her husband Waltter, Chaucer incites readers to espouse Griselda"™s cause against Walter"™s oppression. Thus, efforts to supply historical and theological rationalization for Walter"™s persecutions tend to turn Chaucer"™s fable upside down, to deny its most obvious effect on reader"™s sympathies. Similarly, to assert that Webster"™s Duchess deserved torture and death because she chose to marry the man she loved and to bear their children is, in effect to join forces with her tyrannical brothers, and so to confound the operation of poetic justice, of which readers should approve, with precisely those examples of social injustice that Webster does everything in his power to make readers condemn. Indeed. Webster has his heroin so heroically lead the resistance to tyranny that she may well in spire members of the audience to imaginatively join forces with her against the cruelty and hypocritical morality of her brothers.
Thus Chaucer and Webster, in their different ways, attack injustice, argue on behalf of the victims, and prosecute the persecutors. Their readers serve them as a court of appeal that remains free to rule, as the evidence requires, and as common humanity requires, in favour of the innocent and injured parties. For, to paraphrase the noted eighteenth-century scholar, Samuel Johnson, despite all the refinements of subtlety and the dogmatism of learning, it is by the common sense and compassion of readers who are uncorrupted by the characters and situations in mereval and Elizabetahn literature, as in any other literature, can best be judged.
It can be inferred from the passage that the author believes that most people respond to intended instances of poetic justice in medieval and Elizabethan literature with

Those examples of poetic justice that occur in medieval and Elizabethan literature, and that seem so satisfying, have encouraged a whole school of twentieth- century scholars to "find" further examples. In fact, these scholars have merely forced victimized character into a moral framework by which the injustices inflicted on them are, somehow or other, justified. Such scholars deny that the sufferers in a tragedy are innocent; they blame the victims themselves for their tragic fates.
Any misdoing is enough to subject a character to critical whips. Thus, there are long essays about the misdemeanors of Webster"™s Duchess of Malfi, who defined her brothers, and he behavior of Shakespeare"™s Desdemona, who disobeyed her father.
Yet it should be remembered that the Renaissance writer Matteo Bandello strongly protests the injustice of the severe penalties issued to women for acts of disobedience that men could, and did, commit with virtual impunity. And Shakespeare, Chaucer, and Webster often enlist their readers on the side of their tragic heroines by describing injustices so cruel that readers cannot but join in protest. By portraying Griselda, in the Clerk"™s Tale, as a meek, gentle victim who does not criticize, much less rebel against the prosecutor, her husband Waltter, Chaucer incites readers to espouse Griselda"™s cause against Walter"™s oppression. Thus, efforts to supply historical and theological rationalization for Walter"™s persecutions tend to turn Chaucer"™s fable upside down, to deny its most obvious effect on reader"™s sympathies. Similarly, to assert that Webster"™s Duchess deserved torture and death because she chose to marry the man she loved and to bear their children is, in effect to join forces with her tyrannical brothers, and so to confound the operation of poetic justice, of which readers should approve, with precisely those examples of social injustice that Webster does everything in his power to make readers condemn. Indeed. Webster has his heroin so heroically lead the resistance to tyranny that she may well in spire members of the audience to imaginatively join forces with her against the cruelty and hypocritical morality of her brothers.
Thus Chaucer and Webster, in their different ways, attack injustice, argue on behalf of the victims, and prosecute the persecutors. Their readers serve them as a court of appeal that remains free to rule, as the evidence requires, and as common humanity requires, in favour of the innocent and injured parties. For, to paraphrase the noted eighteenth-century scholar, Samuel Johnson, despite all the refinements of subtlety and the dogmatism of learning, it is by the common sense and compassion of readers who are uncorrupted by the characters and situations in mereval and Elizabethan literature, as in any other literature, can best be judged.
As described in the passage, the process by which some twentieth-century scholars have reached their conclusions about the blameworthiness of victims in medieval and Elizabethan literary works is mot similar to which of the following?

Those examples of poetic justice that occur in medieval and Elizabethan literature, and that seem so satisfying, have encouraged a whole school of twentieth- century scholars to "find" further examples. In fact, these scholars have merely forced victimized character into a moral framework by which the injustices inflicted on them are, somehow or other, justified. Such scholars deny that the sufferers in a tragedy are innocent; they blame the victims themselves for their tragic fates.
Any misdoing is enough to subject a character to critical whips. Thus, there are long essays about the misdemeanors of Webster"™s Duchess of Malfi, who defined her brothers, and he behavior of Shakespeare"™s Desdemona, who disobeyed her father.
Yet it should be remembered that the Renaissance writer Matteo Bandello strongly protests the injustice of the severe penalties issued to women for acts of disobedience that men could, and did, commit with virtual impunity. And Shakespeare, Chaucer, and Webster often enlist their readers on the side of their tragic heroines by describing injustices so cruel that readers cannot but join in protest. By portraying Griselda, in the Clerk"™s Tale, as a meek, gentle victim who does not criticize, much less rebel against the prosecutor, her husband Waltter, Chaucer incites readers to espouse Griselda"™s cause against Walter"™s oppression. Thus, efforts to supply historical and theological rationalization for Walter"™s persecutions tend to turn Chaucer"™s fable upside down, to deny its most obvious effect on reader"™s sympathies. Similarly, to assert that Webster"™s Duchess deserved torture and death because she chose to marry the man she loved and to bear their children is, in effect to join forces with her tyrannical brothers, and so to confound the operation of poetic justice, of which readers should approve, with precisely those examples of social injustice that Webster does everything in his power to make readers condemn. Indeed. Webster has his heroin so heroically lead the resistance to tyranny that she may well in spire members of the audience to imaginatively join forces with her against the cruelty and hypocritical morality of her brothers.
Thus Chaucer and Webster, in their different ways, attack injustice, argue on behalf of the victims, and prosecute the persecutors. Their readers serve them as a court of appeal that remains free to rule, as the evidence requires, and as common humanity requires, in favour of the innocent and injured parties. For, to paraphrase the noted eighteenth-century scholar, Samuel Johnson, despite all the refinements of subtlety and the dogmatism of learning, it is by the common sense and compassion of readers who are uncorrupted by the characters and situations in mereval and Elizabethan literature, as in any other literature, can best be judged.
The author's paraphrase of a statement by Samuel Johnson serves which of the following functions in the passage?

Those examples of poetic justice that occur in medieval and Elizabethan literature, and that seem so satisfying, have encouraged a whole school of twentieth- century scholars to "find" further examples. In fact, these scholars have merely forced victimized character into a moral framework by which the injustices inflicted on them are, somehow or other, justified. Such scholars deny that the sufferers in a tragedy are innocent; they blame the victims themselves for their tragic fates.
Any misdoing is enough to subject a character to critical whips. Thus, there are long essays about the misdemeanors of Webster"™s Duchess of Malfi, who defined her brothers, and he behavior of Shakespeare"™s Desdemona, who disobeyed her father.
Yet it should be remembered that the Renaissance writer Matteo Bandello strongly protests the injustice of the severe penalties issued to women for acts of disobedience that men could, and did, commit with virtual impunity. And Shakespeare, Chaucer, and Webster often enlist their readers on the side of their tragic heroines by describing injustices so cruel that readers cannot but join in protest. By portraying Griselda, in the Clerk"™s Tale, as a meek, gentle victim who does not criticize, much less rebel against the prosecutor, her husband Waltter, Chaucer incites readers to espouse Griselda"™s cause against Walter"™s oppression. Thus, efforts to supply historical and theological rationalization for Walter"™s persecutions tend to turn Chaucer"™s fable upside down, to deny its most obvious effect on reader"™s sympathies. Similarly, to assert that Webster"™s Duchess deserved torture and death because she chose to marry the man she loved and to bear their children is, in effect to join forces with her tyrannical brothers, and so to confound the operation of poetic justice, of which readers should approve, with precisely those examples of social injustice that Webster does everything in his power to make readers condemn. Indeed. Webster has his heroin so heroically lead the resistance to tyranny that she may well in spire members of the audience to imaginatively join forces with her against the cruelty and hypocritical morality of her brothers.
Thus Chaucer and Webster, in their different ways, attack injustice, argue on behalf of the victims, and prosecute the persecutors. Their readers serve them as a court of appeal that remains free to rule, as the evidence requires, and as common humanity requires, in favour of the innocent and injured parties. For, to paraphrase the noted eighteenth-century scholar, Samuel Johnson, despite all the refinements of subtlety and the dogmatism of learning, it is by the common sense and compassion of readers who are uncorrupted by the characters and situations in mereval and Elizabethan literature, as in any other literature, can best be judged.
The author of the passage is primarily concerned with

Woodraw Wilson was referring to the liberal idea of the economic market when he said that the free enterprise system is the most efficient economic system.
Maximum freedom means maximum productiveness; our "openness" is to be the measure of our stability. Fascination with this ideal has made Americans defy the "Old World" categories of settled possessiveness versus unsettling deprivation., the cupidity of retention versus the cupidity of seizure, a "status quo" defended of attacked. The United States, it was believed, had no status quo ante. Our only "station" was the turning of a stationary wheel, spinning faster and faster. We did not base our system on property but opportunity-which meant we based it not on stability but on mobility. The more things changed, that is, the more rapidly the wheel turned, the steadier we would be. The conventional picture of class politics is composed of the Haves, who want a stability to keep what they have, and
Have-Nots, who want a touch of instability and change in which to scramble for the things they have not. But Americans imagined a condition in which speculators, self-makers, runners are always using the new opportunities given by our land. These economic leaders (front-runners) would thus be mainly agents of Change.
The nonstarters were considered the ones who wanted stability, a strong referee to give them some position in the race, a regulative hand to calm manic speculation; an authority that can call things to a half begin things again from compensatorily staggered "starting lines".: Reform" in America has been sterile because it can imagine no change except through the extension of this metaphor of the race, wider inclusion of competitors, "a piece of the action." As it were, of the disenfranchised. There is no attempt to call off the race. Since our only stability is change. America seems not to honor the quite work that achieves social interdependence and stability. There is, in our legends, no heroism of the office clerk, no stable industrial work force of the people who actually make the system work. There is no pride in being an employee (Wilson asked for a return to the time when everyone was an employer). There has been no boasting about our social workers-they are need; empty boasts from the past make us ashamed of our present achievements, make us try to forget or deny the, move away from them. There is no honor but in the wonderland race we must all run, all trying to win, none winning in the end (for there is no end).
The primary purpose of the passage is to

Woodraw Wilson was referring to the liberal idea of the economic market when he said that the free enterprise system is the most efficient economic system.
Maximum freedom means maximum productiveness; our "openness" is to be the measure of our stability. Fascination with this ideal has made Americans defy the "Old World" categories of settled possessiveness versus unsettling deprivation., the cupidity of retention versus the cupidity of seizure, a "status quo" defended of attacked. The United States, it was believed, had no status quo ante. Our only "station" was the turning of a stationary wheel, spinning faster and faster. We did not base our system on property but opportunity-which meant we based it not on stability but on mobility. The more things changed, that is, the more rapidly the wheel turned, the steadier we would be. The conventional picture of class politics is composed of the Haves, who want a stability to keep what they have, and
Have-Nots, who want a touch of instability and change in which to scramble for the things they have not. But Americans imagined a condition in which speculators, self-makers, runners are always using the new opportunities given by our land. These economic leaders (front-runners) would thus be mainly agents of Change.
The nonstarters were considered the ones who wanted stability, a strong referee to give them some position in the race, a regulative hand to calm manic speculation; an authority that can call things to a half begin things again from compensatorily staggered "starting lines".: Reform" in America has been sterile because it can imagine no change except through the extension of this metaphor of the race, wider inclusion of competitors, "a piece of the action." As it were, of the disenfranchised. There is no attempt to call off the race. Since our only stability is change. America seems not to honor the quite work that achieves social interdependence and stability. There is, in our legends, no heroism of the office clerk, no stable industrial work force of the people who actually make the system work. There is no pride in being an employee (Wilson asked for a return to the time when everyone was an employer). There has been no boasting about our social workers-they are need; empty boasts from the past make us ashamed of our present achievements, make us try to forget or deny the, move away from them. There is no honor but in the wonderland race we must all run, all trying to win, none winning in the end (for there is no end).
According to the passage, "Old World" values were based on

Woodraw Wilson was referring to the liberal idea of the economic market when he said that the free enterprise system is the most efficient economic system.
Maximum freedom means maximum productiveness; our "openness" is to be the measure of our stability. Fascination with this ideal has made Americans defy the "Old World" categories of settled possessiveness versus unsettling deprivation., the cupidity of retention versus the cupidity of seizure, a "status quo" defended of attacked. The United States, it was believed, had no status quo ante. Our only "station" was the turning of a stationary wheel, spinning faster and faster. We did not base our system on property but opportunity-which meant we based it not on stability but on mobility. The more things changed, that is, the more rapidly the wheel turned, the steadier we would be. The conventional picture of class politics is composed of the Haves, who want a stability to keep what they have, and
Have-Nots, who want a touch of instability and change in which to scramble for the things they have not. But Americans imagined a condition in which speculators, self-makers, runners are always using the new opportunities given by our land. These economic leaders (front-runners) would thus be mainly agents of Change.
The nonstarters were considered the ones who wanted stability, a strong referee to give them some position in the race, a regulative hand to calm manic speculation; an authority that can call things to a half begin things again from compensatorily staggered "starting lines".: Reform" in America has been sterile because it can imagine no change except through the extension of this metaphor of the race, wider inclusion of competitors, "a piece of the action." As it were, of the disenfranchised. There is no attempt to call off the race. Since our only stability is change. America seems not to honor the quite work that achieves social interdependence and stability. There is, in our legends, no heroism of the office clerk, no stable industrial work force of the people who actually make the system work. There is no pride in being an employee (Wilson asked for a return to the time when everyone was an employer). There has been no boasting about our social workers-they are need; empty boasts from the past make us ashamed of our present achievements, make us try to forget or deny the, move away from them. There is no honor but in the wonderland race we must all run, all trying to win, none winning in the end (for there is no end).
In the context of the authors discussion of regulating change, which of the following could be most probably regarded as a "strong referee" (line 30) in the United
States?

Woodraw Wilson was referring to the liberal idea of the economic market when he said that the free enterprise system is the most efficient economic system.
Maximum freedom means maximum productiveness; our "openness" is to be the measure of our stability. Fascination with this ideal has made Americans defy the "Old World" categories of settled possessiveness versus unsettling deprivation., the cupidity of retention versus the cupidity of seizure, a "status quo" defended of attacked. The United States, it was believed, had no status quo ante. Our only "station" was the turning of a stationary wheel, spinning faster and faster. We did not base our system on property but opportunity-which meant we based it not on stability but on mobility. The more things changed, that is, the more rapidly the wheel turned, the steadier we would be. The conventional picture of class politics is composed of the Haves, who want a stability to keep what they have, and
Have-Nots, who want a touch of instability and change in which to scramble for the things they have not. But Americans imagined a condition in which speculators, self-makers, runners are always using the new opportunities given by our land. These economic leaders (front-runners) would thus be mainly agents of Change.
The nonstarters were considered the ones who wanted stability, a strong referee to give them some position in the race, a regulative hand to calm manic speculation; an authority that can call things to a half begin things again from compensatorily staggered "starting lines".: Reform" in America has been sterile because it can imagine no change except through the extension of this metaphor of the race, wider inclusion of competitors, "a piece of the action." As it were, of the disenfranchised. There is no attempt to call off the race. Since our only stability is change. America seems not to honor the quite work that achieves social interdependence and stability. There is, in our legends, no heroism of the office clerk, no stable industrial work force of the people who actually make the system work. There is no pride in being an employee (Wilson asked for a return to the time when everyone was an employer). There has been no boasting about our social workers-they are need; empty boasts from the past make us ashamed of our present achievements, make us try to forget or deny the, move away from them. There is no honor but in the wonderland race we must all run, all trying to win, none winning in the end (for there is no end).
The author sets off the word "Reform" with quotation marks in order to

Woodraw Wilson was referring to the liberal idea of the economic market when he said that the free enterprise system is the most efficient economic system.
Maximum freedom means maximum productiveness; our "openness" is to be the measure of our stability. Fascination with this ideal has made Americans defy the "Old World" categories of settled possessiveness versus unsettling deprivation., the cupidity of retention versus the cupidity of seizure, a "status quo" defended of attacked. The United States, it was believed, had no status quo ante. Our only "station" was the turning of a stationary wheel, spinning faster and faster. We did not base our system on property but opportunity-which meant we based it not on stability but on mobility. The more things changed, that is, the more rapidly the wheel turned, the steadier we would be. The conventional picture of class politics is composed of the Haves, who want a stability to keep what they have, and
Have-Nots, who want a touch of instability and change in which to scramble for the things they have not. But Americans imagined a condition in which speculators, self-makers, runners are always using the new opportunities given by our land. These economic leaders (front-runners) would thus be mainly agents of Change.
The nonstarters were considered the ones who wanted stability, a strong referee to give them some position in the race, a regulative hand to calm manic speculation; an authority that can call things to a half begin things again from compensatorily staggered "starting lines".: Reform" in America has been sterile because it can imagine no change except through the extension of this metaphor of the race, wider inclusion of competitors, "a piece of the action." As it were, of the disenfranchised. There is no attempt to call off the race. Since our only stability is change. America seems not to honor the quite work that achieves social interdependence and stability. There is, in our legends, no heroism of the office clerk, no stable industrial work force of the people who actually make the system work. There is no pride in being an employee (Wilson asked for a return to the time when everyone was an employer). There has been no boasting about our social workers-they are need; empty boasts from the past make us ashamed of our present achievements, make us try to forget or deny the, move away from them. There is no honor but in the wonderland race we must all run, all trying to win, none winning in the end (for there is no end).
It can be inferred from the passage that the author most probably thinks that giving the disenfranchised" ' a piece of action'" is

Woodraw Wilson was referring to the liberal idea of the economic market when he said that the free enterprise system is the most efficient economic system.
Maximum freedom means maximum productiveness; our "openness" is to be the measure of our stability. Fascination with this ideal has made Americans defy the "Old World" categories of settled possessiveness versus unsettling deprivation., the cupidity of retention versus the cupidity of seizure, a "status quo" defended of attacked. The United States, it was believed, had no status quo ante. Our only "station" was the turning of a stationary wheel, spinning faster and faster. We did not base our system on property but opportunity-which meant we based it not on stability but on mobility. The more things changed, that is, the more rapidly the wheel turned, the steadier we would be. The conventional picture of class politics is composed of the Haves, who want a stability to keep what they have, and
Have-Nots, who want a touch of instability and change in which to scramble for the things they have not. But Americans imagined a condition in which speculators, self-makers, runners are always using the new opportunities given by our land. These economic leaders (front-runners) would thus be mainly agents of Change.
The nonstarters were considered the ones who wanted stability, a strong referee to give them some position in the race, a regulative hand to calm manic speculation; an authority that can call things to a half begin things again from compensatorily staggered "starting lines".: Reform" in America has been sterile because it can imagine no change except through the extension of this metaphor of the race, wider inclusion of competitors, "a piece of the action." As it were, of the disenfranchised. There is no attempt to call off the race. Since our only stability is change. America seems not to honor the quite work that achieves social interdependence and stability. There is, in our legends, no heroism of the office clerk, no stable industrial work force of the people who actually make the system work. There is no pride in being an employee (Wilson asked for a return to the time when everyone was an employer). There has been no boasting about our social workers-they are need; empty boasts from the past make us ashamed of our present achievements, make us try to forget or deny the, move away from them. There is no honor but in the wonderland race we must all run, all trying to win, none winning in the end (for there is no end).
Which of the following metaphors could the authors most appropriately use to summarize his own assessment of the American economic system?

Woodraw Wilson was referring to the liberal idea of the economic market when he said that the free enterprise system is the most efficient economic system.
Maximum freedom means maximum productiveness; our "openness" is to be the measure of our stability. Fascination with this ideal has made Americans defy the "Old World" categories of settled possessiveness versus unsettling deprivation., the cupidity of retention versus the cupidity of seizure, a "status quo" defended of attacked. The United States, it was believed, had no status quo ante. Our only "station" was the turning of a stationary wheel, spinning faster and faster. We did not base our system on property but opportunity-which meant we based it not on stability but on mobility. The more things changed, that is, the more rapidly the wheel turned, the steadier we would be. The conventional picture of class politics is composed of the Haves, who want a stability to keep what they have, and
Have-Nots, who want a touch of instability and change in which to scramble for the things they have not. But Americans imagined a condition in which speculators, self-makers, runners are always using the new opportunities given by our land. These economic leaders (front-runners) would thus be mainly agents of Change.
The nonstarters were considered the ones who wanted stability, a strong referee to give them some position in the race, a regulative hand to calm manic speculation; an authority that can call things to a half begin things again from compensatorily staggered "starting lines".: Reform" in America has been sterile because it can imagine no change except through the extension of this metaphor of the race, wider inclusion of competitors, "a piece of the action." As it were, of the disenfranchised. There is no attempt to call off the race. Since our only stability is change. America seems not to honor the quite work that achieves social interdependence and stability. There is, in our legends, no heroism of the office clerk, no stable industrial work force of the people who actually make the system work. There is no pride in being an employee (Wilson asked for a return to the time when everyone was an employer). There has been no boasting about our social workers-they are need; empty boasts from the past make us ashamed of our present achievements, make us try to forget or deny the, move away from them. There is no honor but in the wonderland race we must all run, all trying to win, none winning in the end (for there is no end).
It can be inferred from the passage that Woodrow Wilson's idea's about the economic market